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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH
SAMUEL R. THURMAN,
Plaint~//

and Appellant.

vs

Case No. 8807

ELDON EDWARD PARTRIDGE,

Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Action by the plaintiff against the defendant to
recover damages to his automobile arising out of an accident which occurred at about 11:20 A. M. on the 18th
of February, 19 56, at the intersection of Cleveland
Avenue and Major Street in Salt Lake City, Utah. Defendant filed a counterclaim for damage to his vehicle.
From a judgment by Third District Judge, Joseph G.
Jeppson, holding both parties guilty of negligence which
contributed to the accident, the plaintiff has appealed.
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The evidence will show that Major Street and Cleveland A venue are both narrow streets, with Cleveland Avenue running east and west and Major Street north and
south. Both streets are of blacktop construction with
Cleveland Avenue being approximately 21 feet wide and
Major Street approximately 3 5 feet, (R. 3 8). On the
southeast corner of the intersection from the east edge of
the blacktop on Major Street to the sidewalk on the east
side of Major Street it is approximately 10-12 feet including a small strip of grass, (R. 39). The sidewalk is about
2-2-~ feet in width, (R. 33). There is a home on the
southeast corner of the intersection which stands within
18 inches to 2 feet of the sidewalk on Major Street, (R.
34, 58 A), and within 2-3 feet of the sidewalk on Cleveland Avenue, (R. 43). A solid row of trees extends south
from the southeast corner on the east side of Major Street,
(R. 32), being about 1 foot west of the sidewalk, (R. 33),
and there are about 3-4 trees extending east from the
southeast corner on Cleveland Avenue, (R. 32). The
trees and the home substantially obstructed the vision for
north and westbound traffic approaching the intersection,
( R. 3 4, 3 5, 50) . Defendant testified that the house and
trees obstructed vision until a car approached a point
where it almost entered the intersection, (R. 50). The
Court found as a fact that vision was obstructed by the
house and trees on the southeast corner of the intersection,
(R. 69).
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It had been snowing most of the morning but it was
not snowing at the time of the accident. The snow was
approximately 6 inches deep on the ground and on the
two streets.
The plaintiff was driving in a northerly direction
on Major Street and the defendant in a westerly direction
on Cleveland Avenue. At the Cleveland A venue entrance
to the intersection there was placed ((Yield Right of Way"
signs. The signs were approximately 24 inches along the
top and each side and 12 inches across the bottom, (R. 42).
Plaintiff testified that he approached the intersection
at a speed of 20-25 miles per hour, (R. 25), and that when
he was at a point about 20-30 feet from the interse~tion,
(R. 25), he saw the defendant approaching from the east.
At that time plaintiff said defendant's vehicle was 50
feet east of the intersection and was approaching the intersection at a speed of 15 miles per hour and that it appeared
to be slowing, (R. 26, 29). Plaintiff estimated defendant's speed at impact at 10 miles per hour, (R. 29).
Plaintiff did not notice defendant's vehicle again until
plaintiff was almost through the intersection and just
before the impact, (R. 3 8) .
Defendant, on the other hand, testified that he was
at the east sidewalk line or 6-8 feet east of it traveling
10 miles per hour, (R. 49), when he first observed the
plaintiff's car which was then 3 0 to 3 5 feet south of the
south sidewalk line of the intersection, (R. 51), and that
plaintiff's vehicle was traveling 2 5 miles per hour and
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did not slow at any time, (R. 53, 59). Defendant had
looked to the south before arriving at the intersection but
stated he did not see plaintiff's vehicle, (R. 56). He
looked north and then again south at which time he saw
plaintiff's vehicle, (R. 56). He applied his brakes and
attempted to turn to the right to avoid the accident but
was unable to stop or turn much, (R. 49).
The left front of the defendant's vehicle struck the
right center portion of plaintiff's vehicle, (R. 53), at a
point just east of the center line of Major Street and when
the front of plaintiff's vehicle was at about the north
line of the intersection, (R. 54) . Defendant had approached the intersection from a point about 100-150 feet
back of the intersection at a speed of about 15 miles per
hour, (R. 46, 47, 59), and was slowing as he approached.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING
CONTRIBUTORY NEGLIGENCE UPON THE PART
OF THE PLAINTIFF.
POINT II.
THE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH
RESPECT TO THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE PLAINTIFF ARE SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE.
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POINT III.
THERE WAS NO IRREGULARITY IN THE
PROCEEDINGS Of' THE COURT AND NO ABUSE
OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT.

POINT IV.
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED UNDER THE
FACTS TO THE RIGHT OF WAY AT THE INTERSECTION UNDER THE STATE STATUTE PERTAINING TO RIGHT OF WAY GOVERNING OPEN
INTERSECTIONS BECAUSE THE PLACEMENT
OF THE YIELD RIGHT OF WAY SIGN AT THE
INTERSECTIO,N ENTRANCE FROM CLEVELAND
AVENUE WAS INVALID AND INEFFECTIVE.
((A"

THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING PLACEMENT OF STOP SIGNS WAS
INVALID BECAUSE IT ESTABLISHED
A RULE OF EVIDENCE.

((B"

THE YIELD RIGHT OF WAY SIGN WAS
NOT PLACED OR USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE STATE STATUTE
AND AS PRESCRIBED BY THE SIGN
MANUAL OF THE STATE ROAD COMMISSION.
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uc" THE YIELD RIGHT OF WAY SIGN DID
NOT CONFORM TO THE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SIGN MANUAL PERTAINING TO YIELD RIGHT OF WAY
SIGNS.
ARGUMENT
POINTS I AND II. THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN
FINDING CONTRffiUTORY NEGLIGENCE UPON
THE PART OF THE PLAINTIFF AND TiiE FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WITH RESPECT TO
NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFF ARE SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE.
Plaintiff's own evidence is that he approached the
intersection at a speed of 20-25 miles per hour. He did
not at any time reduce his speed although the evidence
is clear that visibility is very limited and restricted for
the driver of west and northbound vehicles approachin{
the intersection. The vision was obstructed by a homt
constructed on the southeast corner within 18 inches to
2 feet of the sidewalk on Major Street and 2-3 feet of the
sidewalk on Cleveland A venue. The west side of the
home was not over 12-14 feet from the blacktop edge of
the street, or about 4-5 feet from the shoulder of the road,
and had a solid line of trees to the west of it which also
obstructed vision. The conditions on the north side of
the home were somewhat similar. The street was covered
with snow and it was slippery. With the limited visibility
and the slippery condition of the road plaintiff could not
have brought his vehicle to a stop at a point from the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
20-30 feet south of the intersection where he states he first
saw defendant's vehicle, or could have seen defendant's
vehicle before colliding with other vehicles entering the
intersection. Utah's basic speed law, Section 41-6-46
( 1 ) , Utah Code Annotated 19 53, provides that no person
shall drive a vehicle on a highway at a speed greater than
is reasonable and prudent under the conditions and having
regard to the actual and potential hazards then existing.
. . . Subsection 3 provides: ((The driver of every vehicle
shall consistent with the requirements of Subdivision
( 1) of this section drive at an appropriately reduced speed
when approaching and crossing an intersection . . . and
when special hazards exist with respect to ... other traffic
or by reason of weather or highway conditions."' On a
dry highway at 25 miles per hour it would take plaintiff
approximately 61 feet to stop after discovering danger.
However, on snow it would take him much further before
he could bring his vehicle to a halt. Considering his speed,
the limited visibility at the intersection and the slippery
highway, the court might very easily and properly conclude that plaintiff was driving too fast for existing conditions in view of all the existing hazards.

Section 41-6-72. 10 (c) Utah Code Annotated 1953
as amended provides as follows:
uwhen a Yield Right-of-Way sign is erected,
the driver of a vehicle approaching said sign shall
slow to a reasonable speed for existing conditions
of traffic and visibility, yielding right-of-way to
all vehicles and pedestrians on the intersecting street
which are so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard."
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The statute does not require vehicles to come to a stop
at the Yield Right-of-Way sign in all instances but to
slow and yield the right of way to all vehicles on the
intersecting street which are so close as to constitute an
immediate hazard. It, therefore, requires the exercise
of judgment upon the party approaching the sign to determine whether the vehicle approaching on the intersecting
street constitutes an immediate hazard. If the aproaching car is an immediate hazard, the right of way must be
yielded to it and the non-favored driver must, if necessary,
come to a stop. However, if the non-favored driver
fails to see the other car approaching the intersection or
does not consider him an immediate hazard, he will not
stop at the Yield Right-of-Way sign and there is, therefore, a duty upon the part of the favored driver to exercise
more caution in approaching such an intersection than if
he were approaching one guarded by a stop sign.
Each driver approaching such an intersection has a
relative duty to approach with caution in view of all the
circumstances and each one has a right to rely upon the
fact that the other driver is required to act in a reasonable prudent manner under all the conditions exsiting at
the time.
Plaintiff testified that when he was 20-30 feet away
from the intersection he was going 20-25 miles per hour
and that defendant was at that time at a point 50 feet
east of the intersection and going 10-15 miles per hour.
Defendant's testimony substantiates the speed of the respective vehicles. Plaintiff was, therefore, going about
twice as fast as the defendant. Plaintiff's statement of
defendant's position at the time he saw him is obviously
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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erroneous. The defendant's testimony with respect to
the position of the two vehicles is apparently the more
accurate. If plaintiff had been traveling at a slower
speed which the existing conditions required, each driver
would have had more time and a better opportunity to observe the approach of the other and avoid the accident.
The evidence clearly supports the court's finding
that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence.
It cannot be said under the circumstances that the
plaintiff was free from negligence as a matter of law and
the finding of the trial court in this instance is binding
upon the appellate court.
Knowing that the intersection had a blind corner on
it, he should have approached the intersection at a much
slower speed so that he could control his vehicle under the
existing circumstances in the event traffic approached
from the east.
((A motorist approaching an intersection
whose view is obstructed should have his car under
such control without regard to the question of
statutory priority of right of way, and hence statutes or ordinances providing for or designating
through ways or streets do not ordinarily modify
requirements regarding speed in approaching obstructed intersections." 2 Blashfield 372, Sec. 1041.
POINT III. THERE WAS NO IRREGULARITY IN
THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE COURT AND NO
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BY THE COURT.
Plaintiff's counsel has filed a Statement of Trial
Judge which he claims supports his contention that there
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was irregularity in the proceedings in that the trial judge
viewed the premises without the counsel being present and
also an abuse of discretion for the same reason.
The record fails to support plaintiff's contention. At
the commencement of the trial while plaintiff's counsel
was making his opening statement he stated that the
accident occurred at the intersection of Cleveland Avenue and Major Street. The trial judge at that time stated
that he knew the corner. Other statements made by the
court which are not part of the record were that he had
traveled that intersection many times; that he used to
travel it on his way to work and was quite familiar with it.
On the morning of the argument, the court stated
that he had driven by the intersection again on his way to
court that morning and again noted the intersection. The
record does not show nor did the court state that his
decision was based upon or influenced by his observations made on the morning of the argument.
ulna case tried before the trial judge without
a jury, where the judge acts as a trier of facts, according to the weight of authority he may, in his
discretion, view the premises in dispute or where
material facts occurred, even in the absence of any
statutory authorization." Section 1128, 53 Am.
Jur. 784.
On the morning set for the argument of the case
plaintiff's counsel had a trial scheduled in the City Court
of Salt Lake City, although he did not mention it to the
trial judge the day before. He was, however, going to
have his associate counsel try the City Court case but
when he was unable to secure his services for the City
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Court trial, he made the appearance himself and sought
to have the District Court Judge postpone the argument on the morning set for the argument and objected
to the District Court proceeding with the argument of
the case. At that time the court stated that he was ready
to decide the case whether plaintiff was ready to argue
his case or not. He did not state what his decision was
or would be and counsel for defendant understood the
court to mean that the appointed time was set and had
arrived and the court was ready to decide the case whether
or not counsel was ready to argue. In fact, the court
stated that counsel had no right to assume that he could
leave the case in the District Court and enter trial in
another court until the case was completed in the District
Court.
We cannot see that the record or the facts sustain
plaintiff's contention of irregularity or abuse of discretion upon the part of the court. The record clearly
sustains the court's finding of negligence upon the part
of the plaintiff.
POINT IV. DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED, UNDER THE FACTS, TO THE RIGHT OF WAY AT
THE INTERSECTION UNDER THE STATE STATUTE PERTAINING TO RIGHT OF WAY GOVERNING OPEN INTERSECTIONS BECAUSE THE
PLACEMENT OF THE YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY
SIGN AT THE INTERSECTION ENTRANCE FROM
CLEVELAND A VENUE WAS INVALID AND INEFFECTIVE.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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uA" THE CITY ORDINANCE AUTHORIZING PLACEMENT OF THE YIELD
RIGHT OF WAY SIGNS IS INVALID BECAUSE IT ESTABLISHES A RULE OF EVIDENCE.
Utah's State Statute authorizing Yield Right-ofWay signs was enacted during the Legislative Session of
19 5 5 and pr<:.vides as follows:
cc41-6-72. 10. Yield right-of-way signs.( a) The state road commission, with reference to
state highways, and local authorities, with reference to highways under their jurisdiction, may at
certain intersections, where safety and efficiency
require the normal right-of-way rule to be modified in favor of one of the highways, erect and
maintain a yield right-of-way sign at such intersections on the minor approaches.

(b) The Yield Right-of-Way sign shall
conform to the specifications outlined in the sign
manual of the state road commission.
(c) When a Yield Right-of-Way sign is
erected, the driver of a vehicle approaching said
sign shall slow to a reasonable speed for existing
conditions of traffic and visibility. yielding rightof-way to all vehicles and pedestrians on the intersecting street which are so close as to constitute an
immediate hazard.
(d) If a motorist approaches an intersection
and finds a car has been stopped at Yield Right-ofWay sign on an intersecting approach and has been
waiting to enter and then starts to enter. the oncoming motorist shall yield the right-of-way to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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him in the same manner as if he had been waiting
at a stop sign."
The ordinance passed by the City Commission under
the authority granted in the State Statute is as follows:
((Sec. 207. Yield right-of-way signs. The City
Traffic Engineer shall erect and maintain a (Yield
Right-of-Way' sign at all intersections where directed by the Board of City Commissioners and
when said sign is erected the driver of the vehicle
approaching a (Yield Right-of-Way' sign shall slow
to a reasonable speed for existing conditions of
traffic and visibility, yielding right-of-way to
all vehicles and pedestrians on the intersecting
street which are so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.
( 1) The driver of any vehicle proceeding
past a (Yield Right-of-way' sign facing his vehicle and who interferes with or collides with the
movement of any vehicle proceeding on the intersecting street shall be deemed prima facie in violation of the section.

( 2) If a motorist approaches an intersection
and finds a car has been stopped at a (Yield' sign
on an intersecting approach and has been waiting
to enter and then starts to enter, the oncoming
motorist shall yield the right-of-way to him in the
same manner as if he had been waiting at a (Stop'
stgn.
( 3) A person violating this section shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor.'J (Italics ours)

It is to be noted that sub-paragraph 1 of said ordinance establishes a rule of evidence in connection with
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
the driver proceeding past a yield right-of-way sign facing his vehicle and who collides with a vehicle proceeding
on the intersecting street.
In the case of Nasfell vs. Ogden City (122 Ut. 344),
249 Pac. ( 2d) , 507, our Supreme Court had before it
an Ogden City Ordinance which read as follows:
uThe presence of a vehicle in or upon any
public street or highway in Ogden City stopped,
standing or parking in violation of any ordinance
of Ogden City, shall be prima facie evidence that
the person in whose name such vehicle is registered
as owner, committed or authorized the commission
of such violation."
Our Supreme Court held that the ordinance was
invalid and we quote from the decision as follows:

uunder the decisions of this court Ogden has
no express or implied power to pass the ordinance in
question. Cities in Utah derive their powers
through express legislative grant, and we look to
our own authority in testing Ogden's powers to
pass the ordinance. Counsel for Ogden cites but one
Utah case, which we do not believe controlling
here, and looks for support of his position to sister
states where fountains of power radically may
differ from our own. Repeatedly we have denied
to cities implied powers which had far greater
proximity of purpose in implementing express
powers gtven, than the implied power claimed here
bears to the generic power granted by the legislature.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Ogden assumes that because cities have been
the power to regulate streets and the parking of
vehicles for a fee, together with general power to
enforce such powers, they necessarily have the implied power to pass an ordinance establishing a rule
of evidence binding on the courts. Such assumption does not stand the test of logic, nor is it
sustained by this cour·... Power to pass an ordinance
establishing a rule of evidence binding on the
courts is not granted to cities in express words, nor
can it be fairly implied from, nor is it incident to,
the powers expressly given. Neither is it essential
to the accomplishment of the objects and purposes
of the powers granted.
We are committed to the principle that cities
have none of the elements of sovereignty, that uany
fair, reasonable substantial doubt concerning the
existence of the power is resolved by the courts
against the corporation (city) and the power
denied." ... uand that grants of power to cities are
strictly construed to the exclusion of implied
powers not reasonably necessary in carrying out the
purposes of the express powers granted."
It is therefore counsel's contention that the decision
in this case is controlling and that the Salt Lake City
ordinance is invalid.
UB" and uc."

THE YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY
SIGN WAS NOT PLACED OR
USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE STATE STATUTE AND AS
PRESCRIBED BY THE SIGN
MANUALOFTHESTATEROAD
COMMISSION; and THE YIELD
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RIGHT-OF-WAY SIGN DID
NOT CONFORM TO THE SPECIFICATIONS OF THE SIGN
MANUAL PERTAINING TO
YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY SIGNS.
In authorizing the use of Yield Right-of-Way signs
the Legislature provided in paragraph (b) of said statute
that the Yield Right-of-Way sign shall conform to the
specifications outlined in the Sign Manual of the State
Road Commission. The State Road Commission has
enacted the following specification in connection with
Yield Right-of-Way signs:

UYIELD RIGHT -OF-wAY" SIGN
The Yield Right-of-Way sign shall be an
equilateral triangle with one point downward,
having a yellow reflectorized background with
black lettering. Its sides shall be a minimum of 30
inches in length. It shall be erected in the same
manner as the Stop sign.
Placement shall be authorized by the Traffic
Engineer only.
WARRANTS FOR YIELD RIGHT-OF-WAY SIGNS
At no place should Yield Right-of-Way signs
be used unless (a) there is relatively light traffic
entering the heavier traveled road from the intersecting road; (b) or where the crossing or merging
traffic streams at an intersection are about equal
in volume with frequent intervals in each that
permit safe crossing and merging movements of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~ehicles; (c)

and where there is good visibility in
both or all directions; (d) and unless it is clearly

shown that traffic will be effectively controlled
through the use of the Yield Right-of-Way signs.
Whenever there is any doubt as to the effectiveness
of its use, install Stop signs or other controls instead." (Italics ours)
The yield right-of-way sign at Cleveland Avenue
according to the testimony was not in the shape of a
triangle, nor was it 30 inches by 30 inches by 30 inches.
The testimony was that the sign was in the shape shown
in Exhibit I and the dimensions were approximately 24
by 24 by 24 by 12 inches. It did not, therefore, even
substantially comply with the specification pertaining to
size and shape.
Counsel directs the Court's attention to the second
paragraph of said Specifications, which provides that
Yield Right-of-Way signs should not be used unless there
is good visibility in both or all directions. The evidence
introduced in this case clearly showed that the southeast
corner of the intersection had very poor visibility in that
both the home and the trees on said corner constituted a
block to visibility. Plaintiff and defendant both testified
of this fact, and the court made a specific finding that
visibility was obstructed at the intersection.
In order to be a valid ordinance, the city had first
to enact an ordinance complying with authority granted
by State Statute and then to set up its signs in conformance
with the State Manual and Specifications established by
the State Road Commission. Section 41-6-22, U.C.A.
19 53, provides as follows:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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((41-6-22. Placing and maintenance upon
local highways by local authorities.-Local authorities, in their respective jurisdictions, shall place and
maintain such traffic-control devices upon highways under their jurisdiction as they may deem
necessary to indicate and to carry out the provisions of this act or local traffic ordinances or to
regulate, warn or guide traffic. All such trafficcontrol devices hereafter erected shall conform to
and be maintained in conformance with the state
manual and specifications." (Italics ours)

The court's attention is also directed to Section 416-16, which provides:
((The provisions of this act shall be applicable
and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdivisions and municipalities therein and no
local authority shall enact or enforce any rule or
regulation in conflict with the provisions of this
act unless expressly authorized herein. Local
authorities may, however, adopt regulations consistent with this act, and additional traffic regulations which are not in conflict therewith."
The city failed to enact a valid ordinance. t-l," "....-r.
ifications with respect to the size and shape of the signs
were not followed and the signs were not placed in conformance with the State Manual. They, therefore, have
no legal significance.
While counsel was unable to find any cases pertaining
to yield right-of-way signs, we feel that the following
cases pertaining to stop signs and ordinances are in point
and are governing as to the ordinance and yield right·
of-way signs in question.
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In the case of Bartlett vs. McDonald (Ohio, Mar.
26, 1937), 17 N·.E. (2d) 284, the city of Youngstown,
Ohio, enacted an ordinance establishing one of two intersecting streets as a main thoroughfare, but failed to erect
stop signs at the intersection as required by the state
statute authorizing the local authorities to enact ordinances establishing main thoroughfares. An accident
ensued and one of the two drivers involved in the accident
filed suit against the other. The party driving on the
street declared by the ordinance to be a main thoroughfare
claimed the right-of-way by reason of the ordinance,
whereas, the other party claimed the right-of-way by virtue of the state statute. The court held the ordinance
invalid for the reason that the stop signs had not been
erected, and the plaintiff, who under the ordinance was
the unfavored driver, was allowed to recover.
In the case of Daniels, et al. vs. Ramirez, et al, ( 1947
Texas), 209 S. W. (2d) 972, a collision occurred at an
intersection between a school bus in which the deceased,
Ramirez, was a passenger and a Chevrolet sedan owned by
Daniels. The jury found both defendants, to-wit: the
driver of the school bus and the driver of the Chevrolet
sedan guilty of negligence. The bus driver was found
negligent for his failure to stop at a stop sign facing the
bus. The other driver claimed he was on a through highway and it was therefore not required that he stop, and
that the bus driver should have stopped. The court held
that inasmuch as the stop sign was erected without authority and maintained without it, it could impose no duty
upon the bus driver, and therefore under the record of the
case, the stop sign was no protection for Daniels, the
driver on the through highway.
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In the case of Albrecht Grocery Company vs. Overfield, (Ohio 1929), 168 N. E. 386, the police department
placed stop signs at an intersection but the City of Akron,
Ohio, failed to pass the ordinance authorizing the placement of the stop sign. A collision occurred between a
vehicle driven in a northerly direction on West Cedar
Street and one being driven in an easterly direction on
Bishop Street. Stop signs were placed on Bishop Street
where it entered West Cedar Street, requiring drivers on
Bishop Street to stop for traffic proceeding along West
Cedar Street. The Albrecht Grocery Company truck being
driven on Bishop Street failed to stop at the stop sign
placed on Bishop Street and the other party secured a
judgment in the trial court against the driver proceeding
through the stop sign. On appeal the appellate court
stated as follows:
«The Council of the City of Akron not having
passed the ordinance so authorized to be passed,
it is quite immaterial whether the police department erected the signs claimed by the plaintiff in
error to have been erected, or whether these signs
were erected near or far from said intersections.
Signs so erected do not have any legal effect whatever and no one is required to pay any attention to
them."
In the case of Popp vs. Barger. 264 Ill. App. 484,
( 19 3 2) , plaintiff brought action against defendant to
recover for damages when a collision occurred on account
of defendant's failure to stop at a stop sign guarding the
intersection where the accident occurred on that portion
of the highway traveled by the defendant. The court
held that the failure of the Department of Public Works
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and Buildings to place a stop sign at the entrance to the
state highway did not relieve the plaintiff from stopping;
it was his statutory duty. The same statute gives the
defendant the right of way and did not require him to
stop before entering the intersection. The court said:

Hit is unfortunate that the Department of
Public Works and Buildings failed to place stop
signs on 25th Street, on which street the plaintiff
was traveling. It wasn't defendant's fault that
they failed to place said signs. The plaintiff saw
the defendant coming 75 feet away, but thought
he would stop for the stop signs. Defendant traveling on the through highway had the right of way,
even though the stop signs faced him."
In LeGere vs. Bunicky, N.H. (1943), 35 Ad. (2)
508, the action involved a collision in an intersection of
cars proceeding at right angles to each other. Plaintiffs
were passengers in the defendant's car. Defendant drove
through a stop sign while proceeding in a northerly direction on Pearl Street and was struck by an East bound car
on Myrtle Street. The defendant requested that the jury
be instructed that the stop sign was not legally established
and that the law of the road relative to intersecting ways
be charged.
The requests which were not given, raised the issue
of whether the stop sign was legally placed, and if so, the
effect of such signs. The court said of course if the
sign was not placed in accordance with statutory authority directly or under an ordinance, then it was a mere
circumstance of the accident, entitled to such consideration as a warning and a suggestion for caution in operating
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a motor vehicle as a reasonable driver under the circumstances would give it but without legal requirement
beyond its bearing as a detail of a situation upon due care
of a driver passing northerly through Pearl Street and
approaching Myrtle Street.
See also Hoover vs. Blackmore (Ohio), 87 N.E. (2),
477.

It is obvious from the decisions rendered in these
cases that the Yield Right-of-Way Sign involved in the
case before the court had no legal significance and that,
at most, it could be considered as just one other factor
involved in the accident along with all the others in
considering the duties of the respective parties. In other
words, the intersection would be considered as an open
intersection, and under the circumstances the negligence
of the plaintiff in failing to yield the right of way to the
defendant would bar the plaintiff from recovery in this
case, as said negligence was a proximate cause of the
accident.

CONCLUSION
The evidence clearly supports the court's finding
of contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff.
No abuse of discretion or irregularity in proceedings was
committed by the court.
The ordinance enacted by
was invalid because it established
Yield Right-of-Way sign placed
not meet the specifications of

the City of Salt Lake
a rule of evidence. The
under the ordinance did
the State Mutual with
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respect to size and shape and furthermore was placed
at an intersection where visibility was not good contrary
to the directive in the State Manual, and it was, therefore,
ineffective and its placement invalid. The State Statute
pertaining to right of way at open intersections governed
the rights of the parties and defendant had the right of
way. Plaintiff's failure to yield the right of way to the
defendant constituted negligence.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH & STRONG and
LAWRENCE L. SUMMERHAYS
Attorneys for Defendant
and Respondent
604-610 Boston Building, Salt Lake

City, Utah.
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